Detección de Anomalías Bajo un Modelo de Seguridad Cognitiva by Herrera, Jonathan et al.
LATIN-AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPUTING (LAJC), Vol VII, Issue 2, December 2020
ISSN: 1390 -9266 – 2020 LAJC34 35
Anomaly Detection 
Under a Cognitive 
Security Model
Detección de Anomalías 
Bajo un Modelo de 
Seguridad Cognitiva
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 01 October 2020
Accepted 16 October 2020
Jonathan Herrera 

















Facultad de Ciencias Administrativas











































































































































LATIN-AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPUTING (LAJC), Vol VII, Issue 2, December 2020
ISSN: 1390 -9266 – 2020 LAJC36 37
 Abstract — Cybersecurity attacks 
are considered among the top five of risks 
worldwide, according to the World Economic 
Forum in the year 2019. This context has 
generated the need to improve the tasks 
of cybersecurity defense in organizations. 
Improving the effectiveness in executing a 
cybersecurity task requires three pillars: people, 
processes and technologies. The proposal 
in this work is to analyze the integration of 
these three components as a strategy to 
improve the effectiveness of the execution of 
operational tasks in cyber defense, specifically 
the detection of anomalies. Based on the 
foundation that: cybersecurity operational 
tasks carried out daily by analysts require the 
use of cognitive processes, and that the use 
of techniques based on technologies such 
as machine learning, data mining and data 
science have generally been used to automate 
cybersecurity tasks, we have considered the 
use of cognitive security, as a strategy to 
improve the anomaly detection process, taking 
into account the cognitive processes and skills 
that are executed by the security analyst.
Keywords — cyber-defense, cognitive security, 
cybersecurity.
The development of computer applications and 
emerging technologies, such as smart cities or 
industry 4.0, have optimized the technology 
services provided by organizations around 
the world. Additionally, the improvement of 
decision-making processes in real time has 
become a challenge for security managers. 
Furthermore, cyber security problems have 
been increasing constantly; attacks on system 
availability, information theft and loss of 
privacy have risen in recent years, according to 
the World Economic Forum [1].
In this context, the need to improve the 
cognitive skills of security analysts, and 
the use of technological tools to support 
cyber operations has increased. From our 
perspective, a direct relationship between the 
development of technological solutions and the 
skills of security analysts is important. Having 
an effective tool, but lacking a person capable 
of handling it, would limit the effectiveness of 
said tool, and on the other hand, an analyst 
with extensive experience who does not have 
effective tools would be limited in his or her 
ability to perform cybernetic operational tasks.
In this study, it is our interest to analyze the 
importance of cognitive security regarding 
anomaly detection. Based on the literature 
review carried out in a previous work [2], “Self-
Awareness as Enabler of cognitive Security”, 
cognitive security is considered as: the ability 
to generate cognition in order to take decisions 
effectively in real time, by either a human or a 
computational system. This ability is based on 
the perception generated by the system from 
its environment and the knowledge about itself, 
which is obtained from the analysis of any type 
of information, structured or unstructured, by 
using artificial intelligence techniques and data 
analysis. Therefore, the system can emulate 
the human thought process for continuous 
learning, decision making and, ultimately, 
security analysis.
Given the fact that we intend to work with 
enormous amounts of data, we propose the 
use of the Elastic Stack (ELK). ELK is a set of 
tools that aim to help improve the indexation, 
searching and manipulation of the data [3]. In 
this study, we implement the ELK stack in order 
to index and analyze the data obtained from 
the IoT-23 dataset, which were downloaded 
directly from [4]. This data is analyzed in 
order to asses the connection and future 
development of a cognitive model, either 
supervised or unsupervised, which could be 
used to classify the data in a more reliable way. 
The results obtained showed a clear distinction 
between the behavior of the malicious traffic 
and the benign traffic, which facilitates the 
development of a future cognitive model based 
on the data.
 Resumen — Los ataques de 
ciberseguridad están considerados entre los 
5 principales riesgos alrededor del mundo, de 
acuerdo al World Economic Forum en el año 
2019. Este contexto ha generado la necesidad de 
mejorar las tareas de defensa de ciberseguridad 
en las organizaciones. Mejorar la efectividad en 
ejecutar una tarea de ciberseguridad requiere 
tres pilares: personas, procesos y tecnologías. 
El propósito de este trabajo, es analizar la 
integración de estos tres componentes como 
una estrategia para mejorar la efectividad 
de la ejecución de tareas operacionales de 
ciberdefensa, específicamente la detección 
de anomalías. Basados en el fundamento de: 
que las tareas operacionales de ciberseguridad 
llevadas a cabo diariamente por analistas, 
requieren de procesos cognitivos, y que el uso 
de técnicas basadas en tecnologías como el 
aprendizaje de máquina, la minería de datos y la 
ciencia de datos han sido usadas generalmente 
para automatizar las tareas de ciberseguridad 
como la detección de anomalías, hemos 
considerado el uso de la seguridad cognitiva, 
como una estrategia para mejorar el proceso 
de detección de anomalías, teniendo en cuenta 
los procesos y habilidades cognitivas que son 
ejecutadas por el analista de seguridad.





































Anomaly Detection Under a Cognitive Security Model
Detección de Anomalías Bajo un Modelo de Seguridad Cognitiva
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
 There are a set of security operational 
tasks that are developed daily by security 
analysts and that requires of the use of 
cognitive skills for their execution. These tasks 
were indicated by IBM at the RSA conference 
in 2017 [5]. On previous related work, we had 
grouped these tasks on base of cognitive 
processes and the Observe–Orient–Decide–Act 
(OODA) cognitive model, proposed by Breton 
(See Table I, Table II and Table III) [6-7].
 The first two cognitive tasks “Review 
incident data” and “Review the events by 
aspect of interest” require the cognitive skill of 
perception by security analyst. The third task 
“Pivot in the data to find atypical values, or 
outliers” requires the cognitive process called 
comprehension. One of the daily operations 
carried out by security analysts, and related 
with these three tasks, is anomaly detection, 
i.e., the analyst's ability to identify outliers that 
could be possible security attacks, based on 
spikes in data traffic or by connections from 
uncommon services. This detection could allow 
TABLE I.  OODA COGNITIVE PHASE AND COGNITIVE 
PROCESS
TABLE II.  COGNITIVE PROCESS AND ITS ATTRIBUTES.
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the security analyst to take the appropriate 
actions, and reduce the impact of the attack.
Within cybersecurity, one of the concerns 
of security managers are anomalies, which 
are defined as the detection of surprising 
or unusual events [5]. There are several 
techniques to detect anomalies, which use a 
range of different methods, however, it should 
be considered that, when the malicious actions 
are caused by perpetrators, the abnormal 
observations tend to be adapted in order to 
appear normal. Another major problem is the 
availability of labeled data, which is needed 
for training and validating the computational 
models. To determine an anomaly, several 
factors should be considered such as: the nature 
of the input data (object, record, point, vector, 
pattern, event, case, sample, observation or 
entity), the availability or not of labels, as well 
as the limitations and requirements induced by 
the domain of the application [6]. 
 Riveiro mentions a five-phase process 
related to the anomaly detection process [8]:
 The first step according to [8], 
is establishing the potentially dangerous 
situation, where the analyst should compare 
it, and update it, according to what would be 
the normal situation in the supervised zone. 
The second step correspond to narrowing the 
set of items, where the analyst zooms in and 
out the data to detect anomalous behavior, 
comparing it with real-time information. In 
this step, [8] suggests the use of data-mining 
techniques to decrease the time needed to 
identify anomalous situations. The third step is 
critical, because the analyst leaves the current 
traffic, in order to evaluate the status of the 
situation. This step is stressful for the analyst, 
due to the potential increase of traffic, or any 
impact in the services of the supervised zone. 
These three steps, defined by [8], require the 
analysts' cognitive processes, which we have 
grouped together in this work within the 
cognitive process called “perception”.
Increasing the analyst's cognitive skills can be 
carried out by several lines of action:
 The objective of this work is to define 
the anomaly detection process by the security 
analyst, in order to translate it to a cognitive 
security model. The first cognitive process, 
used by an analyst for the detection, is the 
perception. The analyst must have the ability 
to detect outliers, by reviewing the data 
generated in the ecosystem. Based on the 
three steps proposed by [8], we propose in 
Figure 1, an anomaly detection process based 
in a cognitive model.
 The security analyst first establishes 
an awareness of the situation. According 
to [9], unsupervised models are more 
TABLE III. COGNITIVE PROCESS RELATED TO
CYBER-ATTACKS
Overview: continuous traffic control   
in real-time.
Filter: define if something is abnormal 
(make a judgment based on their 
experiences).
Waiting Time: in which the event is 
observed in order to evaluate its behavior.
More detail: the situation is analyzed in 
more detail.
Taking-action: define the best responsive 
action.
The first 
The ability to detect patterns and outliers 
from a dataset.
The ability to identify the time when an 
event occurred based on timestamps.
The ability to establish a geographical 
or spatial locality from where the attack 
was originated.
Training,















III. ANOMALY DETECTION BASED ON COGNITIVE SECURITY
Fig. 1. Anomaly detection process based
on a cognitive model 
Fig. 2. Temporal Reasoning in cybersecurity anomaly 
detection
Fig. 3. Unsupervised algorithms for anomaly detection
efficient and appropriate for the detection of 
abnormalities, compared to human analysts. 
The use of supervised algorithms requires 
the establishment of labels, and continuous 
training by a security analyst. However, new 
security attacks may not be identified by the 
analyst, which would limit the effectiveness 
of the algorithm. In this context, unsupervised 
algorithms can have a greater advantage.
 A security analyst requires three 
cognitive functions in order to execute anomaly 
detection:
 So, spatial and temporal reasoning 
are essential in the field of cybersecurity. 
According to [10], temporal and spatial 
representations are not independent between 
them, and different modalities are sensitive 
to the processing of time and space. [10] 
analyzes the hypotheses on the symmetric 
and asymmetric relationships of temporal 
and spatial information, and how they affect 
the decision-making process. In his study, 
he mentions that the relationship between 
these attributes can affect the time taken to 
make a judgement. Additionally, he mentions 
that visual analysis is more sensitive to space 
information that to temporal information.
 In Figure 2, we show some of the 
attributes that could be considered as part of 
the temporal reasoning done by the security 
analyst, in order to perform an anomaly 
detection process. Based on the arguments of 
the cognitive processes proposed by [10], the 
use of algorithms must consider the space-time 
attributes, in order to improve the duration and 
effectiveness in the decision-making process. 
This is particularly important for a security 
analyst, when trying to identify anomalies. 
Additionally, the scheme using unsupervised 
algorithms could be hybrid, given the fact 
that there exists a sufficiently wide range of 
algorithms that can be used for this context. 
In Figure 3, we present an overview of some 
unsupervised algorithms, which could be 
used for space-temporal analysis in anomaly 
detection, among cybersecurity domains.
 Some unsupervised algorithms have 
been used in anomaly detection before. For 
example, hierarchical k-means algorithms 
improve the clustering performance in large 
datasets [11]. Additionally, partition algorithms 
allow to reduce the complexity of time and 
space produced by hierarchical density [12]. 
There are also grid-based algorithms, which 
allow the detection of frequent spatial patterns 
[13]. These grid structures, that use space 
partitioning that converts space into smaller 
intervals, help in reducing computational 
overhead. Finally, in density-base clustering 
data, objects are categorized according to their 
regions of density, connectivity and boundaries 
[14].
 The second step, according to [8] for 
anomaly detection is related to the filtering 
process. Anomaly detection in this step is 
based on the analyst’s experience, so there 
is a high degree of subjectivity. Furthermore, 
the filtering process requires the processing 
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 Index node 
 In the "index" node, Elasticsearch 
7.9.0 was installed as indicated in [16], through 
a Debian package, which was downloaded 
directly from the Elastic servers. Once the node 
was installed, we proceeded to configure the 
elasticsearch.yml file, which is located in the /
etc/elasticsearch directory. In this file, the name 
of the cluster, the name of the node, the address 
for the data, the address for the records and the 
port where it will receive HTTP requests were 
configured. Additionally, x-pack was configured, 
following the steps indicated in [17]. For this 
purpose, the variable xpack.security.enabled 
was set to true in the elasticsearch.yml file, in 
order to enable the x-pack configuration for 
within the Elasticsearch instance. The x-pack 
service contains essential users included; 
whose respective passwords were configured 
by running the elasticsearch-setup-passwords 
service. This service was located in the elastic 
installation folder, and it was run using the 
interactive option.
 Reporter Node 
 In the “reporter” node, the Kibana 
7.9.0 service was installed, following the steps 
indicated in [18]. Similarly, a Debian package 
was used, which was downloaded from the 
Elastic servers. Once Kibana was installed, 
the kibana.yml file was configured, which is 
located in the /etc/kibana folder. The options 
configured in this file were: the server port, the 
host address, the elasticsearch host address, 
the elasticsearch listening port, the existing 
username of "kibana" for elasticsearch and the 
password that was configured in a previous 
step. The Kibana service was started, and kept 
running in background mode.
 Collector Node
 The Logstash 7.9.0 service was 
installed in the "collector" node, following 
the steps specified in [19]; likewise, the 
installation was carried out with the use of a 
Debian package, downloaded from the Elastic 
servers. Once the installation was ready, we 
proceeded to configure only the location of 
the data in the logstash.yml file, since the rest 
is configured in the configuration file of the 
corresponding pipeline. Additionally, in order 
to connect Logstash to Elasticsearch using 
x-pack, a specific user was first configured for 
A. Configuration
 Los algoritmos de OCR permiten 
convertir el texto en una imagen a caracteres 
(códigos de 8 bits, como los representados 
en tablas ASCII). El motor o algoritmo OCR 
adoptado es el motor Tesseract OCR.
B. Data Indexing
 The data that were used belongs to the 
IoT-23 dataset, which is obtained from PCAP 
files and transformed into a connection log 
by using Zeek, which gives them a high-level 
format. These files were downloaded directly 
from the repository mentioned in [4]. In order to 
index them, a .conf file was used, located in the /
etc/logstash/conf.d/ folder; the configuration of 
this file was done according to what is indicated 
in the documentation for logstash 7.9.0 [20]. In 
the input section, the location of the x-pack files 
within the file plugin was configured, which is 
part of the logstash plugins and is specified in 
[20]. Additionally, the start_position variable 
was set to "beginning" and the "sincedb_path" 
variable to "/dev/null". This was done so that 
logstash reads the entire file instead of using 
the default configuration, which only reads the 
last lines and monitors changes.
 The filter section of the configuration 
file was started by checking the received rows 
with “if [message] = ~ / ^ # /”, which then 
executes the “drop” plugin, specified in [21]; this 
is done to filter those lines that are comments 
in the obtained record. Next, the Grok plugin 
was used to filter the rows and separate 
the data into the corresponding attributes, 
assigning each attribute the corresponding 
value as indicated in the header of the log file. 
This Grok filter was tested using the filter test 
function that is available among the Kibana 
plugins. Additionally, the “translate” plugin was 
used to obtain an additional attribute, which 
better explains the connection status from the 
codes that are given in the file. Later, making 
use of several conditionals, the values of '-' 
were replaced in the following attributes: "id.
orig_p", "id.resp_p", "orig_bytes", "resp_bytes", 
"missed_bytes", "orig_pkts", "orig_ip_bytes", 
"resp_pkts", "resp_ip_bytes " and "duration". 
Additionally, the aforementioned values were 
converted to "integer" using the "mutate" 
 The architecture, implemented for this 
study, is made up of three nodes. These 3 nodes 
have specific functions and will be known from 
now on as "collector", "index" and "reporter". 
The "collector" node has an Intel (R) Xeon (R) 
E5-2640 v4 2.40GHz processor, 4GB of DDR4 
ECC memory and a 200GiB NUTANIX VDISK 
disk. The "index" node has the same processor 
and memory characteristics, with the same 
disk model, but with 500GB capacity. Similarly, 
in the "reporter" node, there are the same 
characteristics in processor and memory, with 
storage of 100 GB. All three nodes are running the 
Ubuntu 18.04.4 operating system. Additionally, 
all the nodes are connected through an Ethernet 
network, as shown in Figure 4, with a firewall 
that only allows the passage for port 22, to be 
able to connect using the SSH protocol. The 
functions of each node are differentiated for 
each of the components of the ELK stack. In this 
way, the "index" node is in charge of keeping 
Elasticsearch services running, indexing the data 
and searching for them. The "collector" node is 
in charge of separating, organizing and coding 
the information for its correct indexing within 
the "index" node. Finally, the "reporter" node is 
in charge of keeping the Kibana service running, 
to allow access and corresponding visualization 
of the data that are indexed in Elasticsearch. This 
node is in charge of maintaining a cache with 
of collected data, including their cleaning and 
profiling; therefore, is common in this type 
of process to select a methodology such as 
CRISP-DM, which has been widely used in 
Data-Mining projects. In this study, we have 
established the premise that, it is not feasible 
for the security analyst to have knowledge of 
all possible attacks, and that there are new 
attack vectors every day; the security analyst, 
therefore, starts from a state of uncertainty and 
lack of relevant information. From this point, 
the security analyst must build the necessary 
knowledge for decision making.
 Regarding uncertainty, [15] mentions 
that uncertainty is a property of human in his/
her mental processes. In this context, cognitive 
uncertainty is caused by the incompleteness 
of the important knowledge required (vague 
events), where fuzziness is also included as 
a type of non-statistical uncertainty. [15] also 
mentions that, categorization, is an essential 
function of the cognitive system when 
performing important processes, such as 
reasoning and problem solving. She proposes a 
fuzzy membership function for categorization, 
where the function measures the degree of 
similarity of different objects. We can use fuzzy 
techniques to reduce the subjectivity of the 
security analysis. The fuzzy techniques could 
measure the relationship between two vague 
events: when an attack occurs (time), and 
the source of the attack (space). So, a fuzzy 
technique must be aligned with the temporal-
spatial principle.
 In the third step, there is a need to 
reduce the waiting time and select the best 
option, considering most of the possible 
scenarios. The use of Bayesian networks, with a 
cause-effect scheme, could support a security 
analyst in order to help him/her consider better 
alternatives. Additionally, Bayesian networks 
are effective while modelling large datasets, 
where spatial and temporal information might 
be included. Furthermore, the Integrated 
Nested Laplace Approximations (INLA) 
approach, is a computationally effective and an 
extremely powerful alternative to Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) methods.
IV. EXPERIMENTATION
the data that need to be shown in each query, in 
order to facilitate viewing and searching in real 
time.
 To allow the visualization of the 
Kibana service from a computer external to 
the network, the "reporter" node has been 
provided with a public IP address, where the 
ports 80 and 443 are open to receive requests. 
The aforementioned ports are routed through 
a proxy, implemented using the Nginx service, 
which allows us to redirect incoming traffic to 
the corresponding Kibana port This port (5600) 
has been arbitrarily chosen for communication, 
the default port (5601) would also have the 
same functionalities.
Fig. 4. Big Data Architecture
Logstash, as specified in [19]. This user was 
configured using Kibana’s interface, where an 
Index Pattern called logstash-  and a user role 
called “logstash_writer” were created, with the 
following privileges:
 Finally, a user named logstash_internal 
was created, with the role of logstash writer, and 
a password was configured for its access.
Cluster: "monitor" and "manage_index_
templates"
Index: "write", "create", "delete" and 
"create_index" in the indexes that meet 
the pattern logstash- *
•
•
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Fig. 5. Data according to Index pattern.
Fig. 6. Average data size according to traffic
Fig. 7.  Ports targeted by malicious traffic.
Fig. 8.  Ports targeted by benign traffic.
Fig. 9.  Anomaly timeline based on multiple metrics.
plugin, specified in [21], with the exception of 
the "duration" attribute, which was transformed 
to "float". Finally, the last plugin used in this 
section is the date plugin, which is detailed in 
[21], where it was indicated that the time value 
is in the "ts" field, and that it is formatted in 
UNIX time.
 In the output section, the “Elasticsearch” 
plugin was used, which is detailed in [22]. 
which was configured with the address of the 
“index” node and the Elasticsearch port. In 
this section, the user created previously for 
the use of Logstash was entered, along with 
its respective password. Additionally, in this 
section the location of a “template” that should 
 Once the data had finished loading 
into the index, an Index Pattern was created 
in Elasticsearch from Kibana. This pattern was 
used to verify the loaded data. As can be seen 
in Figure 5, the loaded data has been correctly 
indexed, with the format established in the 
template that was previously defined. With this 
Index Pattern, a dashboard was created, allowing 
a clearer view of the data that was indexed. To 
create the dashboard, the Kibana tool was used, 
and six visualizations were obtained.
 In Figure 6, the first visualization can 
be seen, which consists of the average size 
of a request and a response according to the 
type of traffic. It can be clearly seen that there 
be used for the creation of the index was 
indicated, specifying its name and that it should 
not be overwritten. In this template, which is 
structured as indicated in [23], we proceeded 
to specify the “mapping” of the index fields. 
This mapping was used to specify the data type 
for all the values that were previously encoded 
in numeric format. The Logstash service was 
then started using the "sudo systemctl start 
logstash" command, to run in background 
mode. Finally, the index was modified through 
the Elasticsearch API to reduce the number 
of replicas to zero, because there is only one 
node working with Elasticsearch and there is no 
possibility of implementing replicas of it.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
are marked differences between benign and 
malicious traffic. In the case of the request, this 
tends to be smaller for benign traffic; while the 
answer is larger for the malicious traffic. This 
can be easily interpreted because the attackers 
tend to request information from the device 
that they are targeting in order to understand 
its vulnerabilities.
 Figure 7, allows us to appreciate the 
ports at which the malicious traffic is being 
directed. As it can be seen, the traffic tends 
to attack specific ports of some well-known 
protocols, such as telnet and HTTP. This is 
obviously done, in order to try to obtain access 
via these ports since they tend to be open in 
most cases. In contrast, in Figure 8, a huge 
difference can be seen in the ports that are 
being targeted by the benign traffic. Since this 
traffic has legitimate petitions, that are used 
to perform communications between the IoT 
devices, this clear difference was expected to 
be seen, according to the type of traffic.
 The data obtained from the IoT dataset 
have allowed us to appreciate the differences 
between the behavior of benign and malicious 
traffic more easily. As it was previously seen, 
the differences in the traffic is clear enough to 
perform a detection by a security analyst only 
by visualizing the behavior of the data. Based 
on this principle, a Bayesian Network could be 
developed in order to detect the anomalies in 
the traffic. One of the obvious rules that could 
be used, would be a detection based on the size 
of the petition, relative to the size of the answer, 
in order to detect a possible attack that tries to 
gather information of the system.
 Figure 9 shows the capabilities of ELK 
to display an anomaly timeline, created in base 
of multiple metrics. For instance, count of events 
versus IP address. This figure is also allowing us 
to identify the time of a day at which an anomaly 
is more likely to appear. Therefore, a system 
could be deployed to alert analysts of incoming 
traffic during those specific times of the day. 
The analyst could, consequently, prepare itself 
for a more focused and intensive analysis of the 
incoming traffic, since it has a higher probability 
of being a possible threat, due to the time of 
the day at which it is currently being performed. 
Additionally, the data clearly shows a difference 
in the ports that are being targeted by the 
malicious traffic, compared to the ports targeted 
by benign traffic. This difference is so prevalent 
that most security analysts already know which 
ports need to be secured, since those ports are 
more likely to be the target for future attacks. 
This data, therefore, allow analysts to protect 
the most vulnerable ports, and prevent them for 
the future, in order to focus their attention in the 
most vulnerable parts of the system.
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 Currently, not only computers generate 
data, but IoT solutions also present an additional 
challenge by having objects connected to 
the internet, such as sensors and appliances 
(televisions, refrigerators or cars), which are 
capable of generating data. 
 The substantial difference from 
our point of view of cognitive security as a 
cybersecurity strategy, versus other strategies, 
is the augmentation of the analysts' cognitive 
skills. Coupling technological, and data science 
solutions, to the cognitive process can generate 
a bidirectional contribution to the technological 
tool or algorithm, because it can be better trained 
and configured. Additionally, the analyst also 
obtains a bidirectional contribution, because 
they will get support in the development of their 
own operational tasks.
 The efficiency at executing tasks 
in cybersecurity, depends of the cognitive 
processes made by a security analyst. 
Additionally, the detection of anomalies also 
requires a cognitive process, and its effectiveness 
depends mostly on the degree of expertise that 
the analyst has. In this study, we have tried to 
highlight the importance of spatial-temporal 
reasoning, as one of the cognitive skills that 
must be developed by analysts to improve the 
anomaly detection processes.
 Based on the spatial-temporal 
reasoning, we have proposed the use of data-
science solutions such as unsupervised machine 
learning algorithms, fuzzy techniques and 
Bayesian networks, which can improve anomaly 
detection processes. In this study we wanted to 
highlight the importance of cognitive security, 
by integrating the point of view of the analyst's 
cognitive processes with the technological and 
analytical solutions available to support them.
The ELK stack has great capabilities for the 
analysis and indexing of data. In addition, it 
VI. CONCLUSION
allows searching and storing data very easily, 
and has enormous possibilities for the analysis 
of large amounts of data. The use of this stack 
for the analysis of traffic data in IoT devices, 
has allowed us to improve the visualization of a 
huge number of records in a very fast time. The 
Kibana tool has great capabilities, which can 
be used to display large amounts of data in an 
intuitive way; with this tool, it has been possible 
to create visualizations with great potential, 
and that take very little time to update, thanks 
to the optimized operations performed in 
the indexes at Elasticsearch. Additionally, the 
implementation of Logstash increases the 
capabilities of the ELK stack, by allowing it to 
perform the indexing of the data in a simple 
way. Logstash functions to perform the reading, 
filtering and writing of information, allow the 
processing of any type of record easily and 
quickly. Finally, the use of the Grok plugin for 
structuring previously unstructured files, is the 
main tool that allows encoding and organizing 
the information in the records.
 Future works on this field could be 
focused in the development of an automated 
system, which would use the data collected for 
this study to train an unsupervised anomaly 
detection algorithm. This algorithm could use 
various techniques, including Isolation Forest, 
Clustering and Histogram based algorithms to 
perform an automatic detection of anomalies, 
in order to help aid the security analyst in his 
work. Additionally, the relative simplicity of 
the previously mentioned algorithms during 
the deployment phase, will make it easy to 
perform real time intrusion detection, without 
causing any significant overhead in the system. 
Therefore, an automated system deployed 
to perform anomaly detection will efficiently 
use the resources and, hopefully, reduce the 
workload of a security analyst in a significant 
manner, without losing efficiency in detecting 
possible intrusions.
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